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Article proposes the signature of an International Treaty in the framework of WIPO
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harbors. As regards filtering measures, the proposed Treaty gives freedom to States
to implement them. Any filtering should be specific, limited, must not impose
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I.

INTRODUCTION

“Europe just approved new copyright rules that could change the
internet.”1 This was one of the many article titles published by news outlets
throughout Europe and the United States in September 2018. These articles
announced amendments introduced within the Proposal of Directive on Copyright
in the Digital Single Market approved by the European Parliament.2 The article
titles led some to imagine the end of the internet as previously known, with
particular negative implications to the U.S. tech giants like Google, Facebook, and
Youtube.
The proposed Directive faced strong criticism as soon as it was published.3
One of the most controversial provisions included was the obligation of the Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) to filter the content uploaded by the platform’s users to
avoid copyright infringements.4 However, this provision was later removed in the
final version of the Directive.5 Even so, the Directive still assigns an active role in
preventing copyright infringement to ISPs—limiting the applicability of safe
harbors in case ISPs fail to obtain authorizations from the copyright owners.6
It seems clear that with the Directive, the EU has a specific European regime
as far as ISPs liability and safe harbors are concerned. This new regime seems to
be in contrast with the existing legislation and practice in jurisdictions outside the
EU. This lack of harmonization will most likely cause damages to the ISPs
operating on a worldwide scale.7 Indeed, ISPs will have to implement a variety of
technical methods and legal strategies to approach these differences. Thus, they will
1

Ivana Kottasová, Europe Just Approved New Copyright Rules that Could Change the Internet,
CNN, (Sep. 12, 2018) https://perma.cc/LDZ7-LGVC; see also Hamza Shaban, The E.U. Just Voted
to Advance Digital Copyright Rules That Would Force Google, Facebook and Others to Pay Up,
Tʜᴇ Wᴀꜱʜɪɴɢᴛᴏɴ Pᴏꜱᴛ, (Sept. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/Q3S6-P6NH; see also Mark Sweney, EU
Copyright Law May Force Tech Giants to Pay Billions to Publishers, Tʜᴇ Gᴜᴀʀᴅɪᴀɴ, (Sept. 12,
2018), https://perma.cc/T7EF-4GA7.
2
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the
Digital Single Market, COM (2016) 593 final (Sept. 14, 2016).
3
Kottasová, supra note 1.
4
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the
Digital Single Market, supra, note 2 at art. 13.
5
Directive 2019/790, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on Copyright
and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and Amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC,
2019 O.J. (L 130).
6
Id. at art. 17.
7
Especially the tech giants: Facebook, Google, Twitter, and YouTube.
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probably be inclined to reduce the number of their investments, abandon ventures,
or not commence operations in markets where burdensome obligations are
imposed. Consequently, the local and global economy would be harmed.
This Paper proposes that States adopt a Multilateral International Treaty
within the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The Treaty should
provide minimum, standard, and reasonable obligations for ISPs concerning the
protection of copyright. It should also implement a uniform ISPs liability regime
with the same minimum safe harbors for all ISPs, regardless of where they are
located.
Part I of this paper provides an overview of the current EU safe harbors
applicable to ISPs. It then focuses on ISPs’ obligation to get authorizations from
the copyright owners and the liability of ISPs in the absence of such authorizations.
Moreover, the Paper analyzes ISPs’ liability, safe harbors, and filtering obligations
in non-EU countries. Finally, Part I suggests that an international harmonized
approach is therefore needed to overcome differences in the domestic legislation of
EU and non-EU countries. Part II proposes a solution to the problem through the
negotiation and adoption of an International Multilateral Treaty. Part III addresses
the potential criticisms of the proposal.
II.

NEW OBLIGATIONS FOR THE INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS (ISP)
PROVIDED UNDER THE EU DIRECTIVE ON COPYRIGHT

The Directive aims at modernizing EU copyright rules, achieving a fully
functioning Digital Single Market, and closing the so-called “value gap” between
internet platforms and copyright holders.8 The definitive text of the Directive
introduces specific obligations for the ISPs as well as a particular liability regime
for ISPs in case they do not get the required authorizations from the copyright
holders. Part I explains the problems created by the new European provisions from
an international perspective.
A.

EU Directive on Copyright

The Directive assigns an active role to ISPs as far as prevention and
enforcement of copyright infringement are concerned. This perspective seems to be
a growing trend at the international level. Since the middle of 2007 entertainment
industries, government legislators, and regulatory agencies increasingly have been
pressuring ISPs to play a more active role in preventing copyright infringement ex8

See Giancarlo F. Frosio, Reforming Intermediary Liability in the Platform Economy: A European
Digital Single Market Strategy, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 19, 26 (2017).
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ante. “Well-organized copyright industry associations have effectively lobbied
governments worldwide, convincing public authorities that greater enforcement
efforts are needed to combat online copyright infringement.”9
Despite this growing trend, many countries of the world do not grant such
an active role to ISPs or provide safe harbors that differ from the EU safe harbors.
As highlighted above, the differences among the domestic legislation on ISPs’
enforcement police powers, liability, and applicability of safe harbors, create a
problem for the ISPs operating at the international level. Therefore, this Paper
encourages an international harmonized approach to these issues.
1.

Current EU Approach to ISP Safe Harbors

In the EU, safe harbors for ISPs are regulated under the E-commerce
Directive10 and more specifically in the transposing laws in each Member State.11
Safe harbors prevent ISPs from being liable provided they meet the requirements
applicable to each particular safe harbor.12 In the E-commerce Directive, safe
harbors regard ISPs exemption from liability for “mere conduit”13, “catching”,14
and “hosting.”15
The Copyright Directive reaffirms the non-applicability of the safe harbor
for hosting activities provided under article 14 of E-commerce Directive when “the
recipient of the service is acting under the authority or the control of the Article 13
provider.”16 Indeed, section 17.3 of the Copyright Directive provides that the safe
9

Jeremy de Beer & Christopher D. Clemmer, Global Trends in Online Copyright Enforcement: A
Non-Neutral Role for Network Intermediaries?, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 375, 404 (2009),
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/29763019.pdf?ab_segments=0%252Fbasic_SYC5152%252Ftest&refreqid=excelsior%3A38085fe1f8524393dfeb77e4e73cca45
(referencing
Wɪʟʟɪᴀᴍ Pᴀᴛʀʏ, Mᴏʀᴀʟ Pᴀɴɪᴄꜱ ᴀɴᴅ ᴛʜᴇ Cᴏᴘʏʀɪɢʜᴛ Wᴀʀꜱ (2009).
10
See Council Directive 2000/31, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on
Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the
Internal Market, 2000 O.J (L 178), 1–16 (EC) (2008), [hereinafter Directive on Electronic
Commerce or E-commerce Directive].
11
Domestic laws of each Member State will not be studied in this Paper.
12
Council Directive 2000/31, supra, note 10 at art. 2 (defining “service provider” as “any natural
or legal person providing an information society service,” as defined under art. 2 (a)).
13
Id. at art. 12. Exemption applies provided that the ISP “(a) does not initiate the transmission; (b)
does not select the receiver of the transmission; and (c) does not select or modify the information
contained in the transmission.”
14
Id. at art. 13.
15
Id. at art. 14(a)(b).
16
Id. at recital 42, recital 44, recital 46 and art. 14(2).
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harbor for hosting will not apply to the situations covered by the article when an
ISP performs an act of communication to the public or an act of making available
to the public. On the other hand, as it will be discussed below, it can be argued that
Article 17.4 provides for a new specific safe harbor with different requirements
based on the size of the ISP involved.
2.

What the Directive Changes

The proposed Directive obligates Member States to ensure that online
content sharing service providers17 perform either an act of public communication
or an act of making available to the public access to copyright-protected works or
other protected subject-matter uploaded by its users. Thus, the Directive obliges
ISPs to get authorization from the right holders. If no authorization is granted, they
will be liable for unauthorized acts of communication to the public, unless they
demonstrate having fulfilled the conditions under section 17.4. No general filtering
obligations are provided in the approved version of the Directive. These provisions
will be further discussed below.
a.

Proposed Obligation to Obtain an Authorization
from the Right Holders

As highlighted above, under section 17.1 of the Directive, the ISPs’ main
obligation is to get authorization from the right holders referred to in Article 3(1)
and (2) of Directive 2001/29/EC [hereinafter InfoSoc Directive]18 in order to
communicate or make available to the public works or other subject matter. They
can do that, for instance, by concluding a licensing agreement. Thus, it is expected
that ISPs:
[W]ill negotiate a license rate with major rights holders
…to compensate owners for potentially infringing uploads. But for
the many other uploads where the rights holder is unknown,
17

“Online content sharing service provider” is defined under article 2 (6) of the Copyright Directive
as “[A] provider of an information society service of which the main or one of the main purposes is
to store and give the public access to a large amount of copyright-protected works or other protected
subject matter uploaded by its users, which it organizes and promotes for profit-making purposes.
Providers of services, such as not-for-profit online encyclopedias, not-for-profit educational and
scientific repositories, open source software-developing and-sharing platforms, electronic
communication service providers as defined in Directive (EU) 2018/1972, online marketplaces,
business-to-business cloud services and cloud services that allow users to upload content for their
own use, are not “online content sharing service providers” within the meaning of this Directive.”
18
Directive 2001/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 On the
Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, art.
2., 2001 O.J. (L 167) 1, 16 (EC).
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service providers will be required to carry out a “best efforts”
diligent search for a rights holder to request a license or be liable
for infringement.19
The difficulties for the implementation of these licenses are clear. This is
especially evident in the determination of the price of the license and how to prove
that best efforts were used to identify and get the license from the right holder.
Section 17.1 poses another problem concerning the identification of the
users whose acts must be included or not in the authorization by providing an
undefined criterion. Section 17.1 requires that the authorization covers acts carried
out by users of the services falling within Article 3 of Directive 2001/29/EC when
they are not acting on a commercial basis or their activity does not generate
significant revenues. The Directive does not define “commercial basis” or
“significant revenues”. These gaps should, therefore, be filed by each Member
State. It may be expected that they will provide different definitions of these
concepts, leading to different applicable rules in the EU Member States.
b.

Liability of the ISP in Case of Violation to the
Obligations Provided Under the Proposed EU
Directive on Copyright

The Directive imposes higher standards of liability on ISPs. This conclusion
can be reached, first, because they will perform an act of communication to the
public or an act of making available to the public when they give public access to
copyright-protected works uploaded by its users (section 17.1). Second, if ISPs do
not get an authorization from the right holders, that they will liable for unauthorized
acts of communication to the public of copyright-protected works and third,
because, under section 17.3 of the Directive, the safe harbor for hosting provided
under Article 14.1 of the E-commerce Directive will not apply to the situations
covered by the Article.
Regarding the liability of ISPs provided under the Directive, some
scholars20 have concluded that the “construction of EU law included in the Proposal
would make hosting providers directly liable, rather than secondarily liable”
because ISPs will perform an act of communication to the public. At this regard,

19

Kris Erickson, The European Copyright Directive: License First, Ask Questions Later, MEDIA
POLICY PROJECT BLOG (Apr. 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/9SW8-53RS.
20
See Giancarlo Frosio, To Filter, or Not to Filter? That Is the Question in EU Copyright Reform,
36 Cᴀʀᴅᴏᴢᴏ Aʀᴛꜱ & Eɴᴛ. L.J. 331, 343 (2018).
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other scholars have stressed: “the alignment between CJEU case law21 and policy
action on the side of the European Commission, especially with regard to the basic
idea that the making available, by a hosting provider, of third-party uploaded
copyright content, may fall within the scope of Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc
Directive22 [acts of communication to the public]”. In sum, if ISPs do not get the
authorizations from the right holders, they will be held primarily liable.
On the other hand, the Directive (probably in an effort to balance the higher
liability imposed on the ISPs) introduces a new specific safe harbor. Indeed, under
section 17.4, in case the ISPs do not get an authorization from the right holders, in
order to avoid liability they will have to demonstrate that they have: (a) made best
efforts to obtain an authorization, and (b) made, in accordance with high industry
standards of professional diligence, best efforts to ensure the unavailability of
specific works and other subject matter for which the right holders have provided
the service providers with the relevant and necessary information,23 and in any
event (c) acted expeditiously, upon receiving a sufficiently substantiated notice by
the right holders, to remove from their websites or to disable access to the notified
works and subject matters, and made best efforts to prevent their future uploads
under paragraph (b). Additionally, according to section 17.5, the following factors
will be considered to determine whether the ISP has complied with these
obligations: (a) the type, the audience and the size of services and the type of works
or other subject-matter uploaded by the users; (b) the availability of suitable and
effective means and their cost for service providers.
Furthermore, the ISPs will have to comply with different conditions in
accordance with their importance and volume of visits. Indeed, under section 17.5
some organizations must respect the requirements under section a) and c) of section
17.4 to be exempted from liability.24 On the other hand, where the average number
21

See Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV and XS4ALL Internet BV. 2017
ECLI:EU:C:2017:45. In this case, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held an ISP
directly liable for performing an act of communication to the public, describing the requirements
for an act to be considered “communication to the public.”
22
Eʟᴇᴏɴᴏʀᴀ Rᴏsᴀᴛɪ, Tʜᴇ CJEU Pɪʀᴀᴛᴇ Bᴀʏ Jᴜᴅɢᴍᴇɴᴛ ᴀɴᴅ Iᴛs Iᴍᴘᴀᴄᴛ ᴏɴ ᴛʜᴇ Lɪᴀʙɪʟɪᴛʏ ᴏғ Oɴʟɪɴᴇ
Pʟᴀᴛғᴏʀᴍs (July 21, 2017), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3006591.
23
It is unclear how the EU will effectively implement this method of providing information to ISPs.
24
Directive 2019/790, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on Copyright
and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and Amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC,
art. 17, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92. The first paragraph of Article 17, Subsection 6 reads "“Member States
shall provide that when new online content sharing service providers whose services have been
available to the public in the Union for less than three years and which have an annual turnover
below EUR 10 million within the meaning of the Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC, the
conditions applicable to them under the liability regime set out in paragraph 4 are limited to the
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of monthly unique visitors of these service providers exceeds 5 million, calculated
based on the last calendar year, ISPs will also demonstrate that they have made best
efforts to prevent further uploads of the notified works for which the right holders
have provided the relevant and necessary information.25
c.

Filtering Obligations

Unlike the previous versions, the final text of the Directive (section 17.8)
clearly states that the application of Article 17 shall not lead to any general
monitoring obligation.26 Despite this, it may be argued that the ISPs will still be
forced to implement filtering measures mainly “to ensure the unavailability of
specific works … for which the right holders have provided the service providers
with the relevant and necessary information” and “to prevent their future uploads
in accordance with paragraph (b)” (section 17.4 letters b) and c)) to be able to
qualify for the exemption of liability in case they did not get authorizations from
the right holders.
Even if the Directive does not provide for mandatory filtering obligations,
it is expected that filters will be implemented anyway to comply with the
requirements of section 17.4. ISPs will probably introduce algorithmic filters
because it will be too difficult to have a human review of huge amounts of content.
This measure will probably cause the preventive removal of the content (regardless
if it’s copyrighted or not) to avoid liability.27 Finally, it is worth pointing out that
the Directive assigns ISPs the role of deciding the applicability of fair uses
exceptions, and therefore, in the absence of non-automatic filters, the content will
be removed if it is not evident that fair uses exceptions apply. Indeed, users might
be affected because the automatic filters that ISPs will surely apply simply
“cannot account for fair use and the other limitations on copyright intended to
protect freedom of speech”.28

compliance with the point (a) of paragraph 4 and to acting expeditiously, upon receiving a
sufficiently substantiated notice, to remove the notified works and subject matters from its website
or to disable access to them.”
25
Id.
26
The implementation of a general monitoring obligation (as it was envisaged in the previous
versions of the Directive) would have been against art. 15 of the E-commerce Directive and against
the CJEU case law. See, e.g. Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Soc. Belge des auteurs
(SABAM), ECLI:EU:C:2011:771, para. 29.
27
Kris Erickson, The European Copyright Directive: License First, Ask Questions Later, LSE
Mᴇᴅɪᴀ (Apr. 2, 2019).
28
Mitch Stoltz, Copyright’s Safe Harbors Preserve What We Love About the Internet, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.eff.org/it/deeplinks/2019/01/copyrights-safe-
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B.

The EU Directive Conflicts with ISP Safe Harbors in Other
Countries

ISP liability, safe harbors, and the role of ISPs in preventing copyright
infringement will be analyzed below in four non-EU countries to show the legal
gap that would be created between these countries and the EU countries. ISPs in
non-European countries have been held secondarily liable unless they have actual
knowledge of the infringing activities of the users or authorize the infringement.
Safe harbors were introduced to limit their liability provided they meet some
specific requirements. No general obligation of filtering is imposed on ISPs in the
countries analyzed. Finally, the analysis below is also relevant to outline the
solution proposed under section II
1.

United States

In the United States, ISPs have traditionally been held secondarily liable.
Cases such as Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Frena29, Sega Enterprises v.
MAHPHIA30, and Religious Tech. Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Services, Inc.31 prompted the telecom and Internet industry groups to lobby for the
enactment of the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act
(OCILLA), part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).32 Section 512
of OCILLA provides four safe harbors for qualified service providers based on (a)
“Transitory Digital Network Communications,” (b) “System Caching,” (c)
“Information Residing on Systems or Networks At Direction of Users,” and (d)
“Information Location Tools.” 33
To qualify for any provision of limited liability under the safe harbors, the
defendant must be a “service provider,” and fulfill the required conditions of
eligibility, including the adoption and reasonable implementation of a “repeat
infringer” policy that “provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of
subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network.”34
harbors-preserve-what-we-love-about-internet
29
Playboy Enterprises v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
30
Sega Enterprises v. Mahphia, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
31
Religious Tech. Center v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Serv., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
32
DANIEL SENG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL APPROACHES TO THE LIABILITY OF
INTERNET
INTERMEDIARIES
para.
155,
at
55
(Nov.
10,
2010),
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/doc/liability_of_internet_intermediaries.pdf.
33
17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a)-(d) (2018); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir.
2012).
34
17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (2018).
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Additionally, the service provider must accommodate “standard technical
measures” that are “used by copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted
works.”35 Service providers must also satisfy the requirements of a particular safe
harbor. To qualify for the safe harbor under § 512(c), which covers infringement
claims that arise “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that
resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service
provider,”– the service provider must have neither actual knowledge that the
material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing nor
awareness of facts and circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.36
The knowledge or awareness must regard “specific infringing activity.”37 In any
case, the provider that gains knowledge or awareness of infringing activity retains
safe harbor protection if it “acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the
material.”38
Under American Law, ISPs are required to remove infringing posts through
an established “Notice and Take-Down” regime.39 In other words, they have only
the obligation to respond to a “notice” that gives a specific file location, but no
obligation to “look for” other infringements of that kind.40 Finally, it must be
pointed out that some ISPs, such as Youtube,41 have implemented filtering
mechanisms allowing the detection and removal of infringing copyrighted content
in cooperation with copyright owners.
2.

Australia

In Australian case law,42 ISPs are held secondarily liable for copyright
infringement under the doctrine of authorization.43 Section 112E was added to the
35

Id. at §§ 512(i)(1)(B), (i)(2).
Id. at §§ 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
37
See Viacom Int’l, Inc., 676 F.3d at 26.
38
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2018).
39
See Jennifer L. Hanley, ISP Liability and Safe Harbor Provisions: Implications of Evolving
International Law for the Approach Set Out in Viacom v. Youtube, 11 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 183, 184
(2012).
40
Jan Bernd Nordemann, Internet Copyright Infringement: Remedies Against Intermediaries-the
European Perspective on Host and Access Providers, 59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 773, 784
(2012).
41
Id. at 784–785.
42
See generally Universal Music Austl. v. Cooper [2006] FCA 78 (Austl.); see also Roadshow
Films Pty Ltd & Ors v iiNet Ltd [2012] HCA 16 (Austl.).
43
See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 36(1) (Austl.) [hereinafter Australian Copyright Act]. See also id.
s 101(1).
36
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Australian Copyright Act44 to provide the ISP with some specific safe harbors.
Moreover, section 116AA of the Australian Copyright Act provides four safe
harbors that apply to the “carriage service providers” (CSPs)45 for copyright
infringements that relate to carrying out certain online activities. Section 116AC46,
Section 116AD47, Section 116AE48, and Section 116AF49 define the four categories
of safe harbor activities. Under Section 116AH50, CSPs must satisfy the general
conditions as well as the specific and detailed conditions for the particular safe
harbor category. In case CSPs satisfy the conditions provided under Section
116AH, the specific limitations under Section 116AG will apply to CSPs.
Australia does not impose an active role to ISPs regarding the prevention
and enforcement of copyright. As a general rule, Section 116AH(2) of the
Australian Copyright specifically provides that the CSP is not required to monitor
its service or to seek evidence of infringing activity.
3.

Canada

Canada has traditionally imposed secondary liability to ISPs in the absence
of authorization. Authorization of copyright infringement was characterized as
direct infringement liability for the ISP.51 The amendments introduced in 2012 to
the Copyright Act52 created a new kind of liability for enabling copyright
infringement over the Internet53 and it also included some safe harbors54 and a
44

See id. s 112E. The provision was added by the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act
2000 (Cth) based on the Agreed Statement to Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996.
45
See id. s 116AA.
46
Id. s 116AC. Category A activity is applicable to CSPs that provide facilities or services for
transmitting, routing or providing connections for copyright material, or the intermediate and
transient storage of copyright material in the course of transmission, routing or providing
connections.
47
Id. Category B activity is applicable to CSPs that cache copyright material through an automatic
process.
48
Id. Category C activity is applicable to CSPs that store, at the direction of a user, copyright
material on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the CSP.
49
Id. Category D activity is applicable to CSPs that refer users to an online location using
information location tools or technology.
50
Id. Section 116AH Item 1 provides that “the carriage service provider must adopt and reasonably
implement a policy that provides for termination, in appropriate circumstances, of the accounts of
repeat infringers.”
51
SENG, supra note 32, at 14.
52
See generally Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42 (Can).
53
Id.
54
These safe harbors “are not revolutionary considering that Canadian courts have addressed
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notice and notice regime. Safe harbors are applicable to ISPs,55 Internet Catching
Services providers56, Internet Storage Service Providers57, and Internet Search
Engine Providers.58 Moreover, Copyright Act sections 41.25, 41.26, and 41.27(3)
provide for a “notice and notice” regime.59 ISPs are not compulsorily required to
remove the infringing content and they can benefit from the safe harbors
independently of whether they comply with the “notice and notice” obligations.60
Finally, Canadian Law does not impose general filtering obligations. It may
be expected that the country will not introduce such measures also to comply with
the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) signed in September
2018. Indeed, this Treaty specifically states that “monitoring” or “affirmatively

pretty extensively the liability of Internet intermediaries despite the absence of statutory provisions
like the DMCA.” David Bensalem, Comparative Analysis Of Copyright Enforcement In The
Cloud Under U.S And Canadian Law: The Liability Of Internet Intermediaries (2012),
https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/33922/3/Bensalem_David_201211_LLM_thesis.
pdf
55
Canadian Copyright Act, Section 31.1 (1) provides: “A person who, in providing services related
to the operation of the Internet or another digital network, provides any means for the
telecommunication or the reproduction of a work or other subject-matter through the Internet or that
other network does not, solely by reason of providing those means, infringe copyright in that work
or other subject-matter.”
56
Canadian Copyright Act, Section 31.1 (3) provides: “Subject to subsection (4), a person referred
to in subsection (1) who caches the work or other subject-matter, or does any similar act in relation
to it, to make the telecommunication more efficient does not, by virtue of that act alone, infringe
copyright in the work or other subject matter.”
57
Canadian Copyright Act, Section 31.1 (5) provides: “Subject to subsection (6), a person who, for
the purpose of allowing the telecommunication of a work or other subject-matter through the
Internet or another digital network, provides digital memory in which another person stores the work
or other subject-matter does not, by virtue of that act alone, infringe copyright in the work or other
subject-matter.”
58
Canadian Copyright Act, Section 41.27 (1) provides: “In any proceedings for infringement of
copyright, the owner of the copyright in a work or other subject-matter is not entitled to any remedy
other than an injunction against a provider of an information location tool that is found to have
infringed copyright by making a reproduction of the work or other subject-matter or by
communicating that reproduction to the public by telecommunication.”
59
By this regime, aggrieved parties can send a notice of infringement to ISPs and the recipient must,
as soon as feasible, forward the notice electronically to the person to whom the electronic location
identified by the location data specified in the notice belongs and inform the claimant of its
forwarding or, if applicable, of the reason why it was not possible to forward it.
60
Online Infringement: Canadian “Notice and Notice” vs U.S. “Notice and Takedown”,
ENTERTAINMENT & MEDIA LAW SIGNAL (June 27, 2012),
http://www.entertainmentmedialawsignal.com/online-infringement-canadian-notice-and-notice-vsus-notice-and-takedown [https://perma.cc/65SD-Y8XU].
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seeking facts indicating infringing activity” is not required.61
4.

China

Under Chinese law, ISPs are secondarily liable on fault-based principles
such as negligence62 or principles of joint or accessory liability.63 For contributory
infringement either for joint or accessory liability to apply, there must be evidence
of the defendant intermediary’s actual knowledge of the infringement.64
The Regulations enacted in 200665 provide safe harbors to ISPs. These rules
establish which kind of network service providers are eligible for safe harbors and
when they are not applicable. The Safe harbors adopted were inspired by § 512
DMCA in the U.S. and the Article 14 E-commerce Directive and are those under
section 20-23.66 It must finally be pointed out that China has enacted no rule
preventing the imposition of a monitoring obligation against copyright
infringement67 under the Provisions enacted in 2013.68
The following chart summarizes the approaches of the countries studied
above as far as ISP liabilities, safe harbors, notice of infringement, and filtering
61

Ernesto Van der Sar, “NAFTA” Replacement Extends Canada’s Copyright Term to Life +70
years, TORRENT FREAK (Oct. 1, 2018), https://torrentfreak.com/nafta-replacement-extendscanadas-copyright-term-to-life-70-years-181001/ [https://perma.cc/4ENY-APKJ].
62
Zhongguo Yinyue Zhuzuoquanxiehui Su Wangyigongsi, Yidongtongxin Gongsi Qinfan Xinxi
Wangluo Chuanbo Quan Jiufenan (中国音乐著作权协会诉网易公司、移动通信公司侵犯信息
网络传播权纠纷案) [Music Copyright Soc’y of China v. Netease Commc’ns., Inc. & Mobile
Commc’ns Corp.], 2003 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 5 (Beijing No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. 2002)
(China).
63
Danny Friedmann, Oscillating from Safe Harbor to Liability: China’s IP Regulation and
Omniscient Intermediaries, WORLD INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY MAP, MAPPING INTERMEDIARY
LIABILITY TRENDS ONLINE (May 18, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2969807.
64
Daniel Seng, Comparative Analysis Of The National Approaches To The Liability Of Internet
Intermediaries, 20 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION.
65
Regulation on the Protection of the Right to Communicate Works to the Public Over
Information Networks, Order No. 468 (promulgated by the the State Council of the People’s
Republic of China, May 18, 2006, effective July 1, 2006), CLI.2.76727(EN) (pkulaw).
66
Friedmann, supra note 63.
67
Xiao Ma, Establishing an Indirect Liability System for Digital Copyright Infringement in China:
Experience from the United States' Approach, 4 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 253, 273–74 (2015).
68
Supreme People’s Court, Dec. 17, 2012, Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several
Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Hearing Civil Dispute Cases Involving Infringement
of the Right of Dissemination on Information Networks (Ch.) [https://perma.cc/U5ES-J7BV].
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C.

Need for an International Approach to the Issue

The differences in domestic copyright enforcement regimes and, especially
the differences in ISPs’ liability among EU (after the Directive) and non-EU
countries, suggest that an international approach to these issues is desirable to limit
a negative impact on ISPs. The certainty of the applicable law for the ISPs can
facilitate the expansion and management of the internet business and help to
achieve a better protection of copyrights.
1.

Lack of Harmonization Poses Difficulties to ISPs

As shown above, domestic legislations around the world have different
approaches for the role of the ISPs and their liability and safe harbor provisions.
This lack of harmonization will be increased as a consequence of the Directive
(especially because each member state may be implementing the Copyright
Directive differently) mainly affecting ISPs with a worldwide presence.
[L]egal changes in one country create global effects. In
theory, [ISPs] can apply different policies and use different
technologies to meet geographically diverse legal obligations. In
practice, though, service providers have to make complex
decisions about whether and to what extent they adjust their
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policies and practices to accommodate differing laws…. [it] is
economically infeasible to institute different policies outside of
Europe. Users of those services will feel the effects worldwide.
Other services may choose to simply cease operations in the EU.
For those companies capable of differentiating their services
(assuming it is possible to comply at all), this represents a step
toward a more fragmented internet — a legal wall put up in
defiance of the idea of the internet as a borderless space for
exchanging information.69
In sum, varying national legal systems create substantial uncertainty for
Google and all the other “internet giants” as they face different liabilities and safe
harbors depending on the applicable law. Thus, they are forced to adopt various
technical methods and legal strategies to approach these differences to avoid
liability. This may create a slowdown in the internet as well as a negative impact
on the global economy.
2.

Impact of the EU Directive on Copyright on International
ISPs

It might be argued that as a result of the Directive, there will be a big shift
as far as ISPs’ liability is concerned with negative results at international level.
Indeed, the Directive expressly provides that the ISPs will be performing an act of
communication to the public, or shall notify the public when it gives the public
access to copyright protected works uploaded by its users. These acts will be
deemed unauthorized if the ISPs do not get authorization from the right holders. In
these cases, the ISPs will be primarily liable rather than secondary liable.
Therefore, it may be argued that in Europe ISPs might be more easily and
more seriously held liable under the Directive, unless they can show compliance
with the requisites under section 17.4. Moreover, to avoid liability under the
Directive, more ex-ante and ex-post obligations are imposed to them as they will
have to use “best efforts” to handle and comply with a variety of important issues
such as: 1) obtain an authorization from the right holders; 2) ensure the
unavailability of specific works; and, 3) prevent future uploads.
69

Stan Adams, Doing the Wrong Thing for the Wrong Reasons: Article 13 Replaces Safe
Harbors with Upload Filters, Won’t Help Artists but Will Hurt the Internet, CDT.ᴏʀɢ (Jan. 18,
2019), https://cdt.org/blog/doing-the-wrong-thing-for-the-wrong-reasons-article-13-replacessafe-harbors-with-upload-filters-which-wont-help-artists-but-will-hurt-the-internet
[https://perma.cc/Q3R4-EZWR].
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On the other hand, as the above chart describes, many countries of the world
impose secondary liability on ISPs based on the doctrine of authorization or the
actual knowledge of the infringement committed by the user of the platform.
Therefore, in these cases, it appears less easy to hold ISPs liable. Furthermore, when
ISPs discover or are informed about the infringement, in non-EU countries they are
traditionally required to remove the infringing content only and are not required to
prevent future uploads of infringing materials.
Thus, it appears clear that in the EU, ISPs will have a more active role
regarding copyright infringement and an increased liability in case of breach of the
obligations under the Directive than in other countries. As highlighted above, it
may be expected that they will have to put in place different legal and technical
strategies to approach the differences in legislation. Apart from being burdensome,
the implementation of these strategies (taking into account also the other
unfavorable provisions of the Directive) will involve relevant financial and human
resources which may discourage them from promoting innovation.
III.

PROPOSING A SOLUTION: SIGNATURE OF A MULTILATERAL
INTERNATIONAL TREATY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF WIPO

Part II proposes that the States of the international community sign a
Multilateral Treaty in the framework of the WIPO on issues regarding the ISPs. An
international instrument of this kind would help to achieve harmonization between
the existing legislations of the States with the aim of providing all actors involved
in the use of the internet (users, industries, artists and ISPs) with the same
applicable rules. A standard set of rules will increase the predictability of the
applicable law for ISPs, leading to an expansion of the internet and to a better
protection of copyrights.
A.

General Guidelines and Text of the Proposed Treaty

The suggested Treaty should be negotiated taking into account the common
rules of the Contracting States applied to ISPs, identifying first what these common
rules are on the basis of their domestic legislations and case law. Its content should
include the role of the ISPs, their liability in case of infringing content uploaded by
their users and applicable safe harbors in case of unlawful activity performed by
their users.
1.

Text of the Proposed WIPO Treaty

The proposed Treaty is generally inspired by existing domestic laws such
as the DMCA and the E-commerce Directive. Moreover, it is drafted following the
writing style of certain recently adopted International Treaties, such as Chapter 20
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of the USMCA70 on Intellectual Property Rights. The text of the suggested Treaty
could be the following:
Measures applied by ISPs to prevent copyright infringement
Contracting Parties shall ensure that ISPs, in accordance with high
industry standards of professional diligence, do their best efforts to
avoid copyright infringement by the users of their platforms by
applying minimum, appropriate, proportional and reasonable
measures. These measures shall include but are not limited to the
obligation of ISPs to provide sufficient visible notice to users
warning about the criminal and civil liability involved in uploading
infringing contents and having their consent as a prior condition for
the publication of the material71, the implementation of a repeat
infringer policy as well as a takedown procedure to ensure that the
infringing content is removed expeditiously. Contracting Parties
shall ensure that filtering measures potentially applied by ISPs
voluntarily or compulsorily are specific, limited, do not impose
substantial costs on ISP or substantial burdens on their systems and
networks and that they are subject to human review. Contracting
Parties shall not impose on ISPs a general obligation to actively
seek facts or circumstances indicating infringing activity.
Liability of the ISPs
Contracting Parties shall provide that ISPs are not held primarily
liable for the infringing content uploaded by the users in their
platforms unless they have actual knowledge of the unlawful activity
and take no prompt and effective measures to stop the infringement.
Safe Harbors
Contracting Parties shall ensure, in their domestic legislations, that
ISPs shall have limited liability for the following activities:

70

The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, U.S.-Mex.-Can., art. 20, agreed to Oct.1, 2018,
[hereinafter USMCA] https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/20Intellectual-Property-Rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/BA7X-EGBY]. This Agreement provides an
example of open provisions to be tailor-made by the contracting States regarding intellectual
property rights.
71
The notice could be provided by visible pop-ups and/or a header banner.
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1) Mere conduit
Mere conduit activities shall include the transmission, routing,
provision of access to a communication network and the transient
storage of the information transmitted, by using automatic technical
processes and for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission.
Contracting Parties, in their domestic legislations, shall provide for
specific requirements for the application of this provision, including
but not limited to the following: the ISP: (a) does not initiate the
transmission; (b) does not select the receiver of the transmission
except as an automatic response to the request of another person;
(c) does not select or modify the information contained in the
transmission; (d) does not store the information for any period
longer than is reasonably necessary for the transmission, routing or
provision of access.
2) Caching
Caching activities shall include the automatic, intermediate and
temporary storage of the information transmitted through the ISP.
Contracting Parties, in their domestic legislations, shall provide for
specific requirements for the application of this provision, including
but not limited to the following: the ISP (a) does not modify the
information; (b) complies with conditions on access; (c) complies
with rules regarding the updating of store (including refreshing,
reloading or other updating of the information) in a manner widely
used by industry; (d) the provider does not interfere with the lawful
use of technology, widely recognized and used by industry; (e) acts
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information it has
stored upon obtaining actual knowledge of the fact that the
information has been removed from the network, or access to it has
been disabled, or that a court or an administrative authority has
ordered such removal or disablement.
3) Hosting
Hosting activities shall include the storage of the information
transmitted by a user through an ISP. Contracting Parties, in their
domestic legislations, shall provide for specific requirements for the
application of this provision, including but not limited to the
following: the ISP: a) does not have actual knowledge of the
infringing activity, b) acts expeditiously to remove or to disable
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access to the information stored upon obtaining actual knowledge
of the copyright infringement or becoming aware of facts or
circumstances from which the infringement is apparent, such as
through receiving a notice of alleged infringement from the
copyright holder.
4) Hyperlinking
Hyperlinking activities shall include the referring or linking users
to an online location by using information location tools, including
hyperlinks and directories. Contracting Parties, in their domestic
legislations, shall provide for specific requirements for the
application of this provision, including but not limited to the
conditions established in the subsection 3 above.
Contracting States shall be free to adopt other safe harbors in
addition to the above.
Take down procedure
Contracting Parties shall ensure that an effective takedown
procedure is implemented in their domestic legislations on the basis
of which the ISPs shall expeditiously remove the infringing content
uploaded by their users upon notice. The take down procedure shall
include an effective notice of claimed infringement and an effective
counter-notice by those whose material is removed or disabled
through mistake or misidentification. The notice of claimed
infringement must contain sufficient information a) to allow the ISP
to identify the work allegedly being infringed and the online location
of the alleged infringement and b) to clearly identify the person
sending the notice.
Enforcement
Contracting Parties shall provide, in their domestic legislations, for
effective enforcement measures of the provisions contained herein,
both civil and criminal. In case matters provided under this Treaty
involve different jurisdictions, Contracting Parties shall cooperate
among them in order to ensure that any judicial or administrative
decision issued in one of the Contracting Parties’ country is
effectively recognized and enforced in another Contracting Parties’
country.
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2.

Explanation of the Treaty Key Provisions

The text of the proposed Treaty was drafted to be attractive for the States to
sign in terms of flexibility. Keeping in mind how hard it is to obtain a consensus of
the States of the international community, both to start negotiating an International
Treaty and then to draft and agree on a common text, the proposed Treaty should
be as open and flexible as possible. This is so States have more incentives and can
more easily gain the domestic consensus72 required to sign it. Moreover, to facilitate
the adoption of this Treaty by the States, its text should include minimum standards
or general principles to be further adopted by all the signatory’s States in their
domestic legislations.73 In other words, the States should be free to implement more
detailed rules based on the general principles provided under the Treaty.
These minimum standards should also be adopted considering the rules
which are commonly applied by the States to the Treaty. These common rules seem
to be the exclusion of a general obligation to monitor by ISPs, the secondary
liability of ISPs in case of infringing content uploaded by their users and the
provision of safe harbors. Moreover, the Treaty should also balance the interests
of both the copyright owners and entertainment industries on one side and the ISPs
on the other side74 as well as the users. This to try to achieve a substantial justice
and gain the consensus of the States as well as of the public opinion.
a.

Role of ISPs

After agreeing on a common definition of ISPs, considering their domestic
laws, States should discuss and negotiate whether to assign ISPs an active,
passive, or neutral role. As mentioned earlier, there is a growing tendency, complete
with lobbyists advocating, to make the ISPs participate in the copyright
enforcement as they may have more effective technical tools to detect and remove
the infringing content. In case the States agree to assign a certain degree of
responsibility of the copyright enforcement to ISPs, the Treaty should also address
the measures ISPs should implement for this purpose (which are suggested to be
75

72

Both of the public opinion and of the domestic legislative bodies.
USMCA, supra note 70 (providing open rules to be incorporated to the domestic laws of the
Contracting States).
74
This is a critical issue because the U.S approach tends to be more protective ofISPs, whereas the
European approach is more protective of copyright owners. See Leon Trapman, American and
European
Safe
Harbors,
KLUWER
COPYRIGHT
BLOG
(Dec.
14,
2016),
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2016/12/14/american-european-safe-harbours/ (“Where the
United States seems to find for the ISPs, the European Union places emphasis on protection of the
right holders”).
75
The definition was not included in the text of the proposed Treaty.
73
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“minimum, appropriate, proportional and reasonable”), including, but not limited
to, providing “sufficient visible notice” before uploading the content, the
implementation of a “repeat infringer policy” and a “takedown procedure”. States
should be free to provide for filtering obligations, without imposing a general
obligation on ISPs to filter the content uploaded in their platforms. If filtering
obligations were to be implemented, the proposed text of the Treaty provides that
these must be “specific, limited” and “not impose substantial costs on ISP or
substantial burdens on their systems and networks and that they are subject to
human review”.
b.

Liability of ISPs

Many countries of the world seem to share the view that, in principle, ISPs
are not held primarily and directly liable for the infringing content uploaded by
their users provided that the ISPs do not have actual knowledge of the infringing
activities and promptly remove the infringing content. Indeed, the user who
published the material violating the protected material is primarily liable for the
infringement. However, ISPs are more frequently sued by copyright holders as it is
easier for them to do so rather than pursuing individuals who are difficult to serve.
These suits often seek injunctions as well as damages. Therefore, the proposed
Treaty includes these principles.
c.

Safe Harbors

Many countries of the world76 grant safe harbors for ISPs for activities
where ISPs perform only automatic processes and thus do not have active
participation in the creation, publication, or modification of the content of the
information transmitted, hosted or stored,77 or actual knowledge of the
infringement. In general, mere conduit, caching, and hosting activities are
exempted from liability, provided that some requirements are met. Thus, the
proposed Treaty could include at least these “traditional” safe harbors and/or
provide new safe harbors according to the evolution of technology up to date.
However, the text of the proposed Treaty has included only the “traditional” safe
harbors in order to more easily get the consensus of the States.
d.

Takedown Procedure

Many countries of the world have adopted a takedown procedure or a notice
76

Including: The United States, Europe, Canada, Australia and China. USMCA, supra note 70, at
art. 20.88.
77
See L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011.

105

EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market and ISP Liability: What's
Next at International Level?

and takedown regime; the suggested Treaty proposes to implement a basic common
takedown procedure, by which the ISPs remove the infringing content posted in
their platforms after notice by the copyright owner. It should also include an
effective notice and counter-notice, to be further implemented in detail in their
domestic legislation. The Treaty should also include the obligation of the ISP to
expeditiously restore the material which was removed or disabled through mistake
or misidentification or when there is enough reliable evidence that the allegedly
infringing material does not infringe any copyright, including but not limited to a
judgment by any judicial or administrative authority.
e.

Enforcement Measures

The content of the Treaty must be able to be enforced at the domestic level
in order to be effective. This is why it includes a section by which the Contracting
Parties undertake to provide in their domestic legislation for effective enforcement
of its provisions both at the civil and criminal levels. Contracting States should be
free to adopt the remedies they consider appropriate. Civil remedies should include
at least injunction proceedings against ISPs in case they authorize or participate in
infringing activities, fines in case they do not provide for measures to prevent the
infringement (including closing down the website if they do not comply with the
national law applying the Treaty), and monetary damages for the benefit of
copyright owners and users. Criminal remedies should be provided for serious
conducts (to be determined by each Contracting State) and should include
imprisonment and/or administrative penalties.
B.

Reasons for Adopting the Proposal

The Treaty outlined above would provide great benefits in terms of
harmonization, economic utility, and improvement of the copyright system
enforcement. The proposal may seem ambitious because it aims at getting the
consensus of the States about important and controversial issues. However, the
benefits are worth the effort of the States in finding common grounds on which the
Treaty may be based.
1.

Harmonization

The proposed Treaty would provide common rules that would help to
harmonize the existing legislation among the Contracting States in the subject
matter of the Treaty. States will later be able to tailor these rules in their domestic
legislations according to their specific needs and culture. Therefore, a Treaty of this
kind would respect each individual State’s culture and needs providing at the same
time uniform rules for industries, copyright owners, and ISPs.
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The Treaty, by providing the same minimum set of rules to the actors
involved in the world of the internet, would increase the predictability of the
applicable law. Predictable rules would provide benefits not only for the ISPs but
also for the copyright owners who will know, for instance, that in the Member
States of the Treaty they will be able to rely on a takedown procedure having the
same common principles. In the end, even if the suggested Treaty is mainly
addressed on ISPs, all actors involved in the world of the internet, such as
industries, copyright owners, and ISPs will benefit from it.
2.

Economic Utility

The suggested Treaty would entail positive effects for the economy both at
the domestic and international levels for several reasons. First, a positive
consequence of having an International Treaty with uniform rules concerning the
ISPs is that they will have a strong incentive to expand their business beyond
borders. This will lead to an international expansion of internet services. This
expansion will benefit the global economy by promoting the creation and use of
new technologies as well as by encouraging the creation of new jobs in the States
adopting the Treaty. Moreover, the potential international expansion of the ISPs
will increase the competition among them, forcing ISPs to provide better and
cheaper services. Indirectly, by providing common rules to the ISPs, the consumers
will also benefit.
3.

Improvement of the Copyright System Enforcement

It seems undeniable that a common set of rules concerning ISPs will
improve the protection of copyrights at the international level. First, it will be more
difficult for copyright infringers to violate the rights of copyright owners because
ISPs will apply the same basic anti-copyright infringement measures in all of the
Contracting States. Copyright infringers will be prevented from publishing
infringing content in most Countries78 by using the same minimum measures.
Therefore, the Treaty is expected to render it more difficult for copyright infringers
to move from one platform to another (platforms which may be located in different
places) trying to find a more favorable ISP (that is to say an ISP favorable or
indifferent to the publication of infringing content). This is because all ISPs will be
forced to apply the same rules and will face the same liability. In the end, it may be
expected that the phenomenon of copyright infringement is likely to be reduced in
extent and therefore, copyright owners and industries will benefit both from an
economic and non-economic standpoint.

78

It would be quite unrealistic to imagine that all countries of the world will sign the Treaty.

107

EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market and ISP Liability: What's
Next at International Level?

IV.

RESPONDING TO POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF THE PROPOSAL

The main criticisms that the proposal may face are that: A) it is not
politically feasible because most countries of the world will not be willing to
negotiate an International Treaty on the liability of the ISPs for a variety of reasons;
and, B) the proposed Treaty does not balance the interests of the actors involved in
the world of the internet (mainly IPSs, copyright owners and internet users). Each
of the above criticisms will be discussed hereinbelow.
A.

The Proposed International Treaty is not Political Feasible

Many scholars, legal professionals, and people in the public opinion may
hold that the International Treaty proposed in this Paper is “unrealistic” and
“utopian”. They may argue that it is tough to “convince” the States to sit around a
table and negotiate a treaty of this kind. The reasons for this expected reluctance
may differ among the countries. Some States may think that the topic is not urgent
or important and therefore they may decide to commit their own (possibly limited)
resources to other issues. Some other States may find it difficult to agree on the
proposed subject matter of the treaty and thus may simply consider that it is not
worthwhile to participate in the negotiations. Finally, some other States (especially
in the cases of underdeveloped countries) may not even believe that the liability of
the ISPs is a “hot topic” applicable to them and, therefore, is not worth regulating
from a worldwide perspective.
I acknowledge that the proposed International Treaty may be considered
“unrealistic” and “utopian”. As discussed earlier in this paper, the idea of promoting
the signature of an International Treaty, regardless of the topic involved, is not an
easy task. States have different, and in most cases opposing, interests. However, in
order to make the proposed treaty appealing to the States, it is of essence that the
WIPO (as the international body which this Paper suggests it should hold the
meetings for the discussion of the Treaty) prepares a detailed working proposal
including all the basic information that a State may need to decide to participate in
the negotiation. This working proposal should explain in detail why the Treaty is
needed and include the starting points for the discussion as well as the benefits that
the Treaty is expected to produce.
Once the representatives of the States fully understand the benefits and
advantages of the suggested Treaty thanks to the working proposal prepared by
WIPO, I believe that they will weigh its pros and cons and decide to join the
invitation to negotiate the Treaty. The following steps (negotiations, agreement on
the text, and signature of the Treaty) will not be easy, but these complicated
procedures are an intrinsic part of the “game” played by sovereign nations in the
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international arena.
B.

The Suggested Treaty Does Not Balance the Interests of the Actors
Involved in the World of Internet

Another potential criticism against the suggested Treaty is that it does not
effectively balance the interests of the main actors involved in the world of the
internet, including copyright owners, internet users, ISPs, publishing companies,
music industries, etc. It may be argued that the Treaty provides too many benefits
for the ISPs at the expense of the other actors mentioned. The content of the Treaty
proposed above tries to weigh the interests of every “player” in the field so that it
may appear to be as balanced and fair as possible for a variety of reasons. First,
even if it may seem a “utopian” goal, the suggested Treaty aims at achieving
fairness and reasonableness on the grounds that the need to regulate the activities
of the ISPs may not necessarily go against the interests of the copyright owners and
the internet users. Second, the suggested Treaty needs to be perceived as “fair” by
the public in order to gain consensus and public acceptance. Otherwise, the
potential criticisms raised by the public may undermine the Treaty’s expected
benefits. Moreover, States should feel more compelled to negotiate and sign the
Treaty if it is perceived as “balanced” by the public opinion of those States.
Obviously, for political reasons, no State in the world would be willing to sign a
Treaty that is perceived as unfair or unreasonable by their public. In sum, the Treaty
should effectively be a win-win opportunity for all players (and should be perceived
as such), rather than favor some players over others.
As mentioned earlier, the suggested Treaty aims at regulating the activity of
the ISPs in a balanced way by protecting all the actors involved. The Treaty protects
the interests of the ISPs by providing e.g. that ISPs are required to apply minimum,
appropriate, proportional and reasonable measures to prevent copyright
infringement, that potential filtering obligations should not impose substantial costs
on ISP or substantial burdens on their systems and networks, and that ISPs will not
have a general obligation to actively seek facts or circumstances indicating
infringing activity. The interests of the copyright owners are also protected by
providing that the ISPs will be required to implement a repeat infringer policy as
well as a takedown procedure to ensure that the infringing content is removed
expeditiously. Moreover, the interests of the internet users are protected by
providing a counter-notice procedure in case the material uploaded is removed or
disabled by the ISPs through mistake or misidentification.
Lastly, it is worth pointing out that the suggested content of the Treaty
should be considered a starting point for the discussion among the States. It is
desirable that before and during the negotiations of the Treaty, the WIPO organizes
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working meetings among the copyright owners, internet users, ISPs, publishing
companies, and music industries both at the national and international levels to
discuss and find common grounds and shared solutions which may enrich and
enhance the Treaty.
V.

CONCLUSION

It may be argued that the EU Copyright Directive has introduced a European
regime of ISPs’ secondary liability which may appear in contrast with the existing
laws in countries outside the EU. This lack of harmonization will have a negative
impact on the ISPs and will eventually lead to a slowdown of the internet on a
global scale. In order to overcome the effects of the non-harmonized legislations
on the ISPs, the signature of an International Treaty in the framework of WIPO is
encouraged. This Treaty should include issues such as the role of the ISPs, the
liability of the ISPs, and safe harbors for ISPs. The benefits expected from the
Treaty are far more significant than the potential criticisms raised against it.
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